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We show that comments by euro area central bankers contain infor-
mation on future ECB interest rate decisions, but that the comments
mainly re°ect recent developments in macroeconomic variables. Further-
more, models using only communication variables are outperformed by
straightforward Taylor rule models. During the ¯rst years of the Euro-
pean Economic and Monetary Union, comments by ECB Executive Board
members and high-level Bundesbank policy-makers were more informative
than comments by national central bank presidents. We also ¯nd that dif-
ferences of opinion were informative when they concerned the outlook for
economic growth. Finally, our results suggest that the ECB used commu-
nication especially to signal interest rate increases.
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11 Introduction
Communication has become a key policy instrument for central bankers. The
main bene¯t of communication is the opportunity to directly in°uence private
sector expectations. There is increasing evidence that central bank communi-
cation a®ects developments in ¯nancial markets (see, for example, Kohn and
Sack (2003), Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004) or GÄ urkaynak, Sack and Swan-
son (2005)). In turn, ¯nancial market participants pay close attention to what
central bankers say as these comments are an important and direct source of
information on future policy decisions.
In all, it seems that the words of central banks may well be as important as
their actions. Naturally, this invites questions on the precise nature of the rela-
tionship between communication and subsequent interest rate decisions. Does
communication yield information on future decisions that could not be obtained
through other sources? Or, is communication as informative as macroeconomic
developments? To what extent is communication a re°ection of these devel-
opments? The ¯rst aim of this paper is to study these issues. We do this by
analysing statements by euro area central bankers during the ¯rst years of the
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
The second aim of this paper is to examine the role of disagreement. Jansen
and De Haan (2006) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) show that, in re-
cent years, euro area central bankers often voiced contrasting opinions on euro
area monetary policy and economic conditions. What, if anything, can market
participants learn from these voiced di®erences of opinion? Does disagreement
hamper the markets' understanding of future policy? Or, alternatively, can
disagreement be informative? By receiving varying messages, agents may be
better able to evaluate the di®erent arguments on which the subsequent deci-
sion is based.
A number of recent papers study the relationship between central bank com-
munication and interest rate policy. Pakko (2005) ¯nds that the bias announce-
ments by the Federal Open Market Committee contain useful information for
predicting future changes in the federal funds target rate. Lapp and Pearce
(2000) reach a similar conclusion with respect to inter-meeting policy changes.
Other studies focus on the European Central Bank (ECB). Gerlach (2004) uses
2the editorials of the ECB monthly bulletin to construct quantitative indicators
of the ECB's assessment of euro area economic conditions. He ¯nds that models
incorporating these indicators can better predict policy decisions than models
which only include macroeconomic variables. Rosa and Verga (2005) ¯nd that
ECB communication can explain changes in market expectations of future pol-
icy. This conclusion is based on an analysis of the introductory statements by
the ECB president at the press conferences after interest rate decisions. Heine-
mann and Ullrich (2005) construct an indicator based on the same statements
and show that an analysis of ECB rhetoric can improve, but not substitute a
Taylor rule model in predicting interest rate changes1.
Central banks communicate using various channels, such as press confer-
ences, releases of minutes, monthly bulletins, speeches and interviews. Our
analysis di®ers from previous papers in its use of statements by central bankers
as reported by the Bloomberg news-wire. We can thus analyse those central
bank comments which would, in all likelihood, reach a large portion of ¯nan-
cial market participants. We have collected Bloomberg news reports containing
statements by various euro area central bankers for the period 4 January 1999
to 2 May 20022. We classify each comment on a ternary scale (+1, 0, -1)
to construct two indicators of ECB communication: a signal and a dispersion
indicator. The signal indicator measures the message of the central bankers
to the public. The dispersion indicator measures the extent to which central
bankers were in disagreement on a particular topic. We use these indicators
in an ordered probit regression framework whilst using Taylor rule models as
a benchmark. We test for the e®ects of disagreement by including dispersion
indicators as additional variables into our communication models. Finally, we
decompose the signal indicators into a component driven by economic devel-
opments and a residual component. This enables us to study the relationship
between macroeconomic variables and communication in more detail.
Our results are as follows. We show that comments by euro area central
1 Siklos and Bohl (2005) study the Bundesbank. They ¯nd that, between 1982 and 1998,
the Bundesbank used communication as a separate instrument, complementary to the interest
rate instrument.
2We did not record reports on the ECB press conferences after rate decisions; the comments
at the press conference are analysed by Heinemann and Ullrich (2005) and Rosa and Verga
(2005).
3bankers contain information on future ECB interest rate decisions. During
the ¯rst years of the EMU, comments by ECB Executive Board members and
high-level Bundesbank policy-makers were more informative than comments by
national central bank presidents. However, models using only communication
indicators are outperformed by straightforward Taylor rule models. More im-
portantly, the information content of the statements was mainly a re°ection
of macroeconomic developments. If we control for this e®ect, communication
has little value added for explaining future decisions. We also show that di®er-
ences of opinion were informative when they concerned the outlook for economic
growth. Finally, we ¯nd that the ECB used communication especially to signal
interest rate increases.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses our
methodology, while section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents the ordered
probit regression results, whereas section 5 discusses the predictive power of dif-
ferent speci¯cations. Section 6 has results for the decomposed communication.
Section 7 gives our conclusions.
2 Methodology
2.1 Communication and interest rate decisions
How do agents form expectations of future interest rate decisions? A logical step
would be to use the rule suggested by Taylor (1993) to analyse the relationship
between decisions and macroeconomic developments. According to the Taylor
rule, the interest rate that the central bank targets (i¤
t) is a linear function
of in°ation (¼t), the equilibrium real interest rate (r¤), the di®erence between
actual in°ation and target in°ation (¼t ¡ ¼¤) and the output gap yt. As the
ECB attributes an important role to developments in the money supply, it makes
sense to include the di®erence between actual money growth and the target level
for the growth of the money supply (mt¡m¤) in the Taylor rule (see also Gerlach
(2004) and Heinemann and Ullrich (2005)). The target interest rate is de¯ned
as follows:
i¤
t = ¼t + r¤ + ®1(¼t ¡ ¼¤) + ®2yt + ®3(mt ¡ m¤) (1)
4Judd and Rudebusch (1998) suggest to allow for a smooth adjustment of the
actual interest rate to the target level:
¢it = °(i¤
t ¡ it¡1) + ½¢it¡1 (2)
By substituting equation (1) into equation (2) and re-writing, we obtain:
¢it = a0 + a1¼t + a2yt + a3mt ¡ °it¡1 + ½¢it¡1 (3)
where a0 = °(r¤ ¡ ®1¼¤ ¡ ®3m¤).
As the ECB changes interest rates in steps that are multiples of 25 basis
points we use ordered probit models. We model the interest rate decision ¢it
as a ternary variable which has the value 0 if interest rates were kept constant,
+1 if interest rates were raised and -1 if interest rates were lowered3. Using (3)
we specify an index function as follows:
¢i¤
t = a1¼t + a2yt + a3mt ¡ °it¡1 + ½¢it¡1 + ²t (4)
where ¢i¤
t is a latent continuous random variable representing the preferred
interest rate change. We assume that the policy decision is characterised by
threshold behaviour: the central bank will change the interest rate if ¢i¤
t passes











Assuming that ²t follows a standard normal distribution, we can write the prob-
abilities of the di®erent outcomes as follows:
Pr[¢it = ¡1jzt] = ©(¿1 ¡ z
0
t¯) (5)
Pr[¢it = 0jzt] = ©(¿2 ¡ z
0
t¯) ¡ ©(¿1 ¡ z
0
t¯) (6)
Pr[¢it = 1jzt] = 1 ¡ ©(¿2 ¡ z
0
t¯) (7)
3Our analysis focuses on the direction of the interest rate changes. One could also take
the size of the changes into account, but, in our case, we would be left with low numbers of
observations in the respective categories.
5where © denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution and zt is a vec-
tor with the explanatory variables [¼t;yt;mt;it¡1;¢it¡1]. This ordered probit
model can now be estimated using maximum likelihood procedures (see Maddala
(1983)).
We ¯rst estimate an ordered probit model using (4) to determine the re-
lationship between decisions and macroeconomic variables. By doing this, we
obtain a benchmark with which we can compare our results for communication.
Next, we estimate an ordered probit model in which we only use our signal
indicators as explanatory variables. In other words, we replace each variable in







t + ²t (8)
where Sx
t denotes the signal indicator on interest rates, in°ation, economic
growth and M3, respectively and ²t » N(0;1).
We also test whether it matters whether central bankers are in agreement
on the topics which they discuss. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) and Jansen
and De Haan (2006) show that euro area central bankers have, at times, been
inconsistent in their comments to ¯nancial markets in recent years. If central
bankers voice di®erent opinions on future policy or the economic outlook, does
this hamper the markets' understanding of future policy? Or, alternatively, is
disagreement informative? By receiving varying messages, the markets may be
able to see the di®erent arguments on which the subsequent decision is based.
We test for the e®ects by introducing indicators that measure disagreement as












t + ²t (9)
where Dx
t denotes the dispersion indicator on interest rates, in°ation, economic
growth and M3, respectively and ²t » N(0;1).
As a part of the analysis, we pay attention to the group of o±cials who
make statements. Comments by certain o±cials may be more informative than
comments by others. We can easily test for this by constructing communication
indicators using only statements by certain groups of central bankers.
62.2 Measures of ECB communication
We use two indicators to measure communication : one measures the signal in
ECB communication, whereas the other measures the dispersion of ECB com-
munication. We gathered the data on ECB communication by searching the
Bloomberg news-wire for statements by euro area central bankers on euro area
monetary policy and economic conditions. The search was performed by scan-
ning the news headlines for keywords such as names of central bankers or issues
related to monetary policy. If the headline contained such a word, we read the
underlying news report to determine whether it contained statements by central
bankers. We focused on statements on interest rates, euro area in°ation and
economic growth and M3. Having collected the relevant reports, we recorded i)
who made statements, ii) what topics were commented on, and iii) what opinion
was expressed with regard to the items under ii). Regarding this latter point,
we coded each comment on a ternary scale. We determined whether a variable
is projected to go downwards, remain at its current level or go upwards. In
the ¯rst case, the comment would receive a value of -1, in the second case it
would receive a value of 0 and in the ¯nal case it would receive a value of +1.
For example, comments projecting lower levels of risk with respect to euro area
in°ation would receive a -1, statements with a positive outlook for economic
growth would receive a +1, while comments suggesting constant interest rates
would receive a 0.
Based on our ternary classi¯cation, we constructed a series of ECB signals









¿ denotes the number of statements with the value +1 on day ¿, n¡
¿
denotes the number of statements with the value -1, D denotes the number of
days to the next interest decision and x is either interest rates, in°ation, eco-
nomic growth or M3. We multiply by the fraction 9:5
(D+1) to take into account
that statements made closer to interest rate decisions may have more impact.
Therefore, we divide by the distance to the next ECB interest decision. Sub-
sequently, in order to re-scale, we multiply by the average number of days to a
decision4.
4In some cases, there are reports of statements on the days of interest rate decisions. To
7To construct the indicators Sx
t , we ¯rst sum Sx
¿ over the periods between
interest rate decisions. As the periods between rate decisions were not of equal
length in the sample, we divided the sum of the daily signals by the number
of days between the time of the decision and the former decision. To re-scale,
we multiply the result by the average number of days between rate decisions,
the average being equal to 15.25. We calculated the indicators using all ECB
comments on a particular topic5. In addition, we constructed the indicators for
di®erent groups of central bankers.
To measure disagreement in ECB communication, we use the dispersion
indicator introduced in Jansen and De Haan (2006)6. The dispersion indicator
is based on our ternary classi¯cation of all comments on a particular topic. We
construct Dx
t as the total distance between the scores divided by the maximum
total distance between the scores. Because the indicator is scaled on a maximum
score, it has the attractive feature that it ranges between 0 (no disagreement)
















where d equals 1 if n is odd and zero otherwise, x is either in°ation, in°ation,
economic growth or M3 and n
+
t denotes the number of statements with the
value +1 in inter-meeting periods, n
¡
t denotes the number of statements with
the value -1 and n0
t denotes the number of statements with the value 0.
For example, assume that in an inter-meeting period there were three com-
ments by ECB o±cials on interest rates. Of these three comments, one suggests
higher rates are to be expected, whereas the other two are neutral. The scores
in this case would be 1, 0 and 0. In the example, the total distance between the
statements equals 2 and, as the maximum total distance equals 4, Di
t equals 0.5.
Once again, we compute the indicator for di®erent groups of central bankers.
prevent that we have to divide by zero, we add 1 to D. The average number of days to
decisions is actually 8.5, but here we also added the 1.
5On a priori grounds, we prefer to take the timing of the statement into account when
constructing the indicator. The patterns of the indicators are very similar if we do not weigh
by the distance to the next decision or the number of days between decisions.
6This indicator is also used in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005).
83 Data
We study the period from 4 January 1999 to 2 May 2002. During this period,
the ECB made 75 interest rate decisions. The ¯rst was made on 7 January
1999, the last on 2 May 2002. On 12 occasions interest rates were changed:
there were 5 downward interest rate changes and 7 upward changes. Searching
Bloomberg, we found 925 reports containing comments by euro area central
bankers during the sample period. We have data on statements by three di®erent
groups: members of the ECB Executive Board (EB), national central bank
(NCB) presidents and high-level policymakers from the Bundesbank7. There
were 277 statements on interest rates, 394 on in°ation, 356 on economic growth
and 98 on M3. EB members made 93 statements on interest rates, 149 on
in°ation, 157 on economic growth and 32 on M3. For NCB presidents, these
¯gures are 135, 210, 174 and 49. For Bundesbank o±cials, the ¯gures are 49,
35, 25 and 17. Table 1 gives a summary of the data, showing the percentage
of statements per topic for the three groups of central bankers and the full
sample. As may be expected, most statements on interest rates were neutral.
In contrast, most statements on economic growth were optimistic in nature.
Finally, it seems that Bundesbank o±cials were less optimistic on growth, more
inclined to point towards rises in M3 and less neutral on interest rates.
Figure 1 shows the development in the ECB main re¯nancing rate (solid
line) and the signal indicator on interest rates (column) over the sample period.
The dates shown correspond to ECB rate changes. In some cases, the signal and
the decision corresponded perfectly. For example, the signal indicator for the
meeting on 3 February 2000 has a value of 13. At this meeting, interest rates
were increased by 25 basis points. However, in other cases, the correspondence
is far from perfect. Figure 2 shows the relationship between dispersion in com-
munication on interest rates (column) and the main re¯nancing rate (solid line).
7The inclusion of this latter group may be understood by remembering that there consisted
a large degree of uncertainty concerning the implementation of the ECB monetary policy strat-
egy at the beginning of the EMU. This created an incentive for ¯nancial market participants
to obtain as much information as possible. The Bundesbank seemed a natural choice in this
respect, as is illustrated by the following quote from a ¯nancial analyst: `Bundesbank council
members are probably as close as one can get to being a °y on the ECB's wall'(Bloomberg, 1
August 2001).
9In most cases, when there is disagreement among central bankers, the dispersion
indicator is equal to or higher than 0.50. Disagreement is mostly visible in 1999
and the ¯rst half of 2000 and towards the end of the sample period.
To estimate the Taylor rule models, we use monthly euro area data on in-
°ation, industrial production (excluding construction) and money growth as
published in the ECB monthly bulletin8. We take data on ECB policy decisions
from the ECB web-site. We choose the monthly bulletin as a data source in
order to approximate the information available to policy makers at the time
of their decisions as closely as possible (see also Coenen, Levin and Wieland
(2005) and Sauer and Sturm (2006)). The Monthly Bulletin reports euro area
data as released by Eurostat with a time lag. For in°ation, this lag is mostly
two months, for money growth it is three months and for industrial production
it is three to four months. For in°ation, we use the most recent value of the
year-on-year change in HICP in°ation. For money growth, we use the most
recent reported value of the three-month moving average of annualised growth
in M3, as this is the value that the ECB is supposed to target.
To proxy the output gap, we use two measures. Firstly, we use the pub-
lished series of industrial production (excluding construction). There are only
a limited number of months reported in each monthly bulletin. Therefore, we
add historical Eurostat data for the months that are not reported, starting in
1985:1. We calculate the output gap as the di®erence between the natural log-
arithm of the index of industrial production (1995=100) and the trend of this
series, where we use a HP ¯lter for de-trending. As we use monthly data, we use
a smoothing parameter of 14,400. The second output gap measure is based on
the economic sentiment indicator (ESI) as published by the European Commis-
sion (see also Gerlach (2004) and Sauer and Sturm (2006)). The ESI is based
on con¯dence indicators for consumers, the retail sector, the construction sector
and the manufacturing sector. In the case of the ESI, we use data obtained from
the European Commission web-site9. We use the di®erence between the value of
the ESI in a particular month and a long-term average. The long-term average
8As there were two interest rate decisions per month until November 2001, the monthly
values are, in most cases, used to explain two subsequent decisions.
9http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy ¯nance/indicators/business consumer sur-
veys/bcsseries en.htm. At this point in time, the ESI also incorporates an indicator
for the services sector.
10is calculated using a rolling window consisting of the 144 preceding months.
4 Results for ordered probit regressions
Table 2 shows full sample results for the ordered probit models. Columns (1)
and (2) show results for our two speci¯cations of the Taylor rule, where the
¯rst column uses data on industrial production and the second column uses
the sentiment indicator. The coe±cients are comparable for both speci¯cations.
The coe±cient for HICP in°ation is between 1.16 and 1.26 and signi¯cant at
the 10 % level in both cases. The coe±cient for both industrial production and
the ESI are highly signi¯cant (p < 0.01). The coe±cient for the lagged level
of the re¯nancing rate is negative and signi¯cant, which points to smoothing in
interest rate setting. Finally, the pseudo-R2 equals 0.25 for the ¯rst model and
0.38 for the second model.
If we replace the variables in the Taylor speci¯cation by communication
variables, we ¯nd, ¯rstly, that the ¯t of the model deteriorates substantially:
the pseudo-R2 drops to 0.10 (column (3)). Furthermore, the only variable for
which we ¯nd a signi¯cant coe±cient is the ECB signal on interest rates. If we
condition the results on the level of dispersion (column (4)), the ¯t of the model
improves, albeit slightly, to 0.17. Our estimate for the coe±cient of the signal
on interest rates is comparable to the one we found before, but now, in addition,
we ¯nd a signi¯cant coe±cient for the dispersion indicator on economic growth.
However, this model based on communication has a worse ¯t than both Taylor
rule models.
Table 3 shows estimation results for groups of central bankers. We show
results for EB members (column (1) and (2)), NCB presidents (columns (3) and
(4)) and Bundesbank o±cials (columns (5) and (6)). We show estimates with
and without dispersion indicators. When comparing these estimates, we ¯nd
that in all three cases the ¯t of the model is better when we include both signal
and dispersion indicators10. For the EB members and the NCB presidents,
this is due to the dispersion indicator on economic growth, whereas for the EB
members the dispersion indicator on interest rates is also signi¯cant. Comparing
10We do not use the dispersion indicators for M3, as the number of observations di®erent
from zero is very small (· 7)
11the models for the di®erent groups, we ¯nd the best ¯t for the EB members
and the Bundesbank o±cials. In both cases, this is mainly due to the signal
indicator on interest rates, which are highly signi¯cant in both cases. For the
NCB presidents, none of the signal indicators is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero
at the 10 % level.
To test for the e®ects of dispersion, we performed likelihood ratio tests.
The unrestricted models are speci¯cations with signal and dispersion indica-
tors, whereas the restricted model restricts the coe±cients for one or all of the
dispersion indicators to be equal to zero. Table 4 has results. Firstly, except
for the case of the EB members, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the three
coe±cients of the dispersion indicators are di®erent from zero. However, if we
only test for the dispersion indicator on growth, the story changes. Now, the
Bundesbank is the only case for which we cannot reject the null. For the full
sample and the NCB presidents we reject the null, whereas for the EB members
we can reject the null that none of the three indicators matter. In other words,
disagreement can be linked to interest rate decisions, especially if the di®erences
of opinion concern the economic outlook.
This is further corroborated by studying marginal e®ects. Table 5 shows
results for three speci¯cations: the Taylor rule with industrial production, the
Taylor rule with the sentiment indicator and our communication model. All
marginal e®ects are evaluated at sample means. The e®ects for the variables
in the Taylor rule are, in general, larger than the e®ects of the communication
variables. This holds in particular for the signal indicators. The only indicator
for which the marginal e®ects are di®erent from zero is the indicator on interest
rates. In this case, the sign of the e®ect is consistent with expectations: a higher
interest rate indicator has a positive e®ect on the probability of an interest
rate rise and a negative e®ect on the probability of an interest rate lowering.
Concerning the dispersion indicators, we only ¯nd a signi¯cant e®ect for the
indicator on economic growth. The sign of the e®ect is, once again, noteworthy:
higher dispersion on growth increases the probability of a lower interest rate
and decreases the probability of higher interest rates.
125 Evaluating predictive power
To what extent are the estimated models able to re-produce the timing and the
nature of ECB interest rate decisions? To examine this, we determine the deci-
sion with the highest level of probability according to our model and compare
this prediction with the actual outcome. Table 6 has the full sample results,
while table 7 has group results. The second column of both tables lists the
actual distribution of rate decisions during the sample period. Under the head-
ing distribution, we list the distribution of the predicted decisions. Under the
heading % correct, we list the fraction of correctly predicted decisions, correctly
predicted changes and correctly predicted downward and upward changes.
What emerges from tables 6 and 7 is the inability of our models to predict
downward interest rate changes. Almost without exception, the models do not
predict any downward changes, and, as a result, predict none of the 5 downward
changes correctly. The most balanced and, for that matter, accurate model is
the Taylor rule model using the ESI data (table 6, column 4). The model
predicts both downward and upward changes. In all, it predicts 1 out of 3
changes correctly. Why are upward rate changes more predictable? Figure 1
may hold the explanation. There are more positive signals than negative signals.
Moreover, the positive signals are larger in absolute value. In general, it is easier
for a central bank to lower rates than to raise them. It would, therefore, be likely
that this is re°ected in more active communication before upward interest rate
changes. During the ¯rst years of EMU, this explanation seems to be true for
the ECB.
Furthermore, we ¯nd that dispersion helps to make better predictions. Com-
paring the last two columns of table 6 shows that the inclusion of dispersion
indicators in the model leads to better predictions than if we only use signal
indicators. However, the result is still not as good as for the case of the Taylor
rule using the ESI. We ¯nd similar results if we focus on the di®erent groups.
The models with dispersion indicators allow for somewhat better forecasting,
but do not outperform straightforward Taylor rule models. Finally, we ¯nd, as
would be expected on the basis of the results in table 3, that communication
by EB members and high-level Bundesbank o±cials was more informative than
comments by NCB presidents. The models using NCB communication always
13predict `no change'. Models using both signal and dispersion indicators cor-
rectly predict 16.7 % of the changes for the EB and 25 % of the changes for the
Bundesbank.
6 Decomposing communication
Until now, the results suggest that analysing communication or analysing macroe-
conomic variables will yield, more or less, similar results. We have, however,
still not explicitly addressed the relationship between macroeconomic variables
and ECB communication. Therefore, we decompose the signal indicators of
ECB communication in two components: one component driven by macroeco-
nomic developments and one residual component. We do this by running OLS
regressions of each signal indicator on the variables in the Taylor rule:
Sx




where x is either interest rates, in°ation, economic growth or money supply.
We interpret the predicted values from this regression, ^ Sx
t , as the part of com-
munication which is driven by recent macroeconomic developments. It is the
communication that an observer of the ECB would expect on the basis of the
state of the economy. We use the residuals as a measure for the part of com-
munication which is not a re°ection of economic developments. We use both
measures in an ordered probit framework. First, we study e®ects of the pre-
dicted values on interest decisions using the following index function:
¢i¤
t = c1 ^ Si
t + c2 ^ S¼
t + c3 ^ S
y
t + c4 ^ Sm
t + ºt; ºt » N(0;1) (13)







t + Àt; Àt » N(0;1) (14)
where Ãx
t denote the residuals for interest rates, in°ation, output and M3, re-
spectively. Using (13) and (14) we can assess which part of communication is
informative by assessing the signi¯cance of the coe±cients.
Table 8 presents the full sample results for the OLS regressions of the signal
indicators on the macroeconomic variables11. We see that the signals are mainly
11We only present results using the sentiment indicator. Results when using the output gap
14determined by developments in economic sentiment. There is also a strong
relationship to the lagged level of the main re¯nancing rate. Developments
in in°ation and money growth do not seems to be signi¯cant determinants of
the signal. Table 9 presents the results for the ordered probit model based
on (13), while table 10 presents the results for estimating the model based on
(14). The contrast is striking. Table 9 shows that predicted communication is
useful in explaining interest rate decisions. This is due to the fact that past
economic developments are useful in explaining policy, as can be seen from the
¯rst two columns of table 2. If we use ¯ltered communication, the signi¯cant
results disappear, with the exception of the signal on economic growth by the
Bundesbank. So, there is little evidence that non-macro driven communication
is informative with respect to ECB interest rate decisions12. This leads to the
conclusion that this particular form of communication is informative, but that
it primarily provides similar information as recent economic developments.
7 Conclusions
This paper studies the relationship between central bank communication and
subsequent interest rate decisions using comments by euro area central bankers.
In contrast to the proverb, we ¯nd that a word to the wise is not enough.
Models that only use communication indicators do not outperform straightfor-
ward Taylor rule models. More importantly, we show that the information in
communication was mainly a re°ection of macroeconomic developments. If we
¯lter communication for this e®ect, communication has little value added for
explaining future decisions. For the European Central Bank, of course, a learn-
ing process may have occurred. Our sample period ends in May 2002. In recent
years, ECB communication may have improved, in this respect. Nevertheless,
the observed pattern raises interesting issues. What, for example, is the use of
central bank watching, when similar information may be obtained by directly
analysing economic developments?
are similar. We also do not show results per group, as results are similar. Results available
upon request from the corresponding author.
12The models are also poor predictors of future decisions: they predict `no change' for every
decision. Results available upon request.
15Our results also suggest that agents may learn from disagreement among
central bankers, especially when it concerns the outlook for economic growth.
We show that disagreement on this issue and decisions are correlated. In ad-
dition, using indicators for disagreement improves the predictive power of com-
munication models. Does this automatically imply that showing disagreement
is bene¯cial? Not necessarily. We have not taken any detrimental e®ects that
disagreement may have into account. To take a simple example, what if disagree-
ment increases volatility in ¯nancial markets and thus, potentially, uncertainty?
Future research should consider the possible positive and negative e®ects of
dispersion explicitly.
We document di®erences in the information content of comments by di®erent
groups of central bankers. During the ¯rst years of the European Economic
and Monetary Union, comments by ECB Executive Board members and high-
level Bundesbank o±cials had a larger information content than those by NCB
presidents. Whether comments by the Bundesbank continue to be of great
importance in recent years remains a matter to be determined empirically. We
would expect the importance of this group to have declined over time.
Finally, we show that the ECB used communication more actively when
upward interest rate changes were concerned. This is rationalized by the fact
that downward interest rate changes will, in all likelihood, receive a warmer
welcome from the public than upward changes. It would be interesting to study
this issue in more detail for other major central banks, such as the US Federal
Reserve or the Bank of England.
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Signal on interest rates (left axis) Main refinancing rate (right axis)
This ¯gure describes developments in the ECB main re¯nancing rate and the signal on
interest rates between 4 January 1999 and 2 May 2002. The dates on the horizontal axis
correspond to the timing of ECB interest rate changes and the endpoints of the sample period
(MMDDYYYY). The left axis shows the signal on interest rates, the right axis shows the
level of the main re¯nancing rate.

































































































































































Dispersion on interest rates (left axis) Main refinancing rate (right axis)
This ¯gure describes developments in the ECB main re¯nancing rate and dispersion on
interest rates. between 4 January 1999 and 2 May 2002. The dates on the horizontal axis
correspond to the timing of ECB interest rate changes and the endpoints of the sample period
(MMDDYYYY). The left axis shows the dispersion on interest rates, the right axis shows the
level of the main re¯nancing rate.
20Table 1: Ternary classi¯cation of ECB statements
Comment on: Executive Board NCB presidents BuBa¤ Full sample
Rates: Up 12.9 14.1 18.4 14.4
Neutral 83.9 82.2 71.4 80.9
Down 3.2 3.7 10.2 4.7
In°ation: Up 23.5 24.3 28.6 24.2
Neutral 47.7 39.5 45.7 43.3
Down 28.9 36.2 25.7 32.5
Growth: Up 82.8 72.4 52.0 75.4
Neutral 7.0 12.1 16.0 10.1
Down 10.2 15.5 32.0 14.6
M3: Up 31.3 24.5 41.2 29.6
Neutral 37.5 40.8 29.4 37.8
Down 31.3 34.7 29.4 32.7
Notes: ¤ Bundesbank o±cials excluding the President.
The entries in this table are the percentages of the total number of statements per category
per group. The sample period is 4 January 1999 to 2 May 2002.
21Table 2: Full sample results for ordered probit models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Taylor Taylor ECB signal ECB signal & dispersion
HICP in°ation 1.26* 1.16* - -
(0.66) (0.66)
Ind. production 0.95*** - - -
(0.25)
ESI - 2.56*** - -
(0.65)
M3 0.13 0.63* - -
(0.26) (0.35)
it¡1 -2.07** -1.45** - -
(0.81) (0.72)
¢it¡1 0.09 -0.75 - -
(0.43) (0.57)
Signal
Interest rates - - 0.17** 0.15**
(0.07) (0.07)
In°ation - - -0.03 -0.03*
(0.02) (0.02)
Economic growth - - -0.02 -0.03
(0.05) (0.07)
M3 - - 0.02 0.03
(0.06) (0.06)
Dispersion
Interest rates - - - 0.40
(0.98)
In°ation - - - 0.73
(0.47)
Economic growth - - - -1.03**
(0.51)
M3 - - - -0.83
(1.00)
¿1 -6.74 -0.93 -1.49 -1.73
¿2 -2.93 4.12 1.58 -1.60
Log pseudo-L -30.94 -25.65 -36.99 -34.13
Pseudo-R2 0.25 0.38 0.10 0.17
Note: This table gives results for ordered probit regression models of ECB interest deci-
sions. The sample period is 4 January 1999 to 2 May 2002. Standard errors in parentheses,
*/**/*** denotes signi¯cance at the 10/5/1 % level. We use Hubert-White robust estimates
of variance in all cases.
22Table 3: Results for groups of central bankers
Executive Board NCB presidents Bundesbank o±cials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Signal
Interest rates 0.69*** 0.89*** -0.04 -0.06 0.34*** 0.32***
(0.22) (0.26) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11)
In°ation 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.12)
Economic growth 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.10 -0.04 0.01
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)
Dispersion
Interest rates - -2.57** - -1.13 - -1.02
(1.22) (1.66) (1.04)
In°ation - -0.39 - -0.15 - -1.21
(0.54) (0.66) (1.00)
Economic growth - -1.68** - -0.96* - -1.03
(0.67) (0.52) (0.85)
¿1 -1.44 -2.04 -1.47 -1.79 -1.49 -1.63
¿2 1.61 1.49 1.39 1.23 1.55 1.52
Log pseudo-L -36.26 -31.17 -40.58 -38.57 -35.76 -34.61
pseudo R2 0.12 0.24 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.16
Note: This table gives results for ordered probit models of ECB interest decisions using
communication indicators per group. The sample period is 4 January 1999 to 2 May 2002.
Standard errors in parentheses, */**/*** denotes signi¯cance at the 10/5/1 % level. We
use Hubert-White robust estimates of variance in all cases. We do not use the dispersion
indicators for M3 due to a low number of observations di®erent from zero.
23Table 4: Likelihood-ratio tests for dispersion
Leaving out: LR-statistic p-value
Full sample
all dispersion indicators 5.7 0.22
dispersion on growth 4.0** 0.05
EB
all dispersion indicators 10.2** 0.02
NCB
all dispersion indicators 4.1 0.26
dispersion on growth 3.1* 0.08
Bundesbank
all dispersion indicators 2.3 0.51
Note: This table gives LR statistics to test for the e®ects of dispersion. The unrestricted
model has both signal and dispersion indicators. The restricted model leaves out one or all of
the dispersion indicators. */**/*** denotes signi¯cance at the 10/5/1 % level . We do not














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 6: Predictive power: full sample results
ECB Ordered probit models
decisions¤ Taylory Taylorz ECB signal Signal & dispersion
Distribution
% lower rates 6.7 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0
% constant rates 84.0 100.0 89.3 96.0 97.3
% higher rates 9.3 0.0 6.7 4.0 2.7
% correct
Total - 84.0 84.0 82.7 86.7
Changes 0.0 33.3 8.3 16.7
Lower rates - 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0
Higher rates 0.0 42.9 14.3 28.6
Notes:
¤ This column shows the distribution of ECB interest rate changes (5 lower, 63 unchanged
and 7 upward) between 4 January 1999 and 2 May 2002.
y This column shows results using industrial production.
z This column shows results using the ESI.
26Table 7: Predictive power: results for groups
ECB Signaly Signal & dispersiony
decision¤ EB NCB BuBa EB NCB BuBa
Distribution
% lower rates 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3
% constant rates 84.0 97.3 100.0 97.3 97.3 100.0 94.7
% higher rates 9.3 2.7 0.0 2.7 2.7 0.0 0.0
% correct
Total - 86.7 84.0 86.7 86.7 84.0 86.7
Changes 16.7 0.0 16.7 16.7 0.0 25.0
Lower rates - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Higher rates 28.6 0.0 28.6 28.6 0.0 42.9
Notes:
¤ This column shows the distribution of ECB interest rate changes (5 lower, 63 unchanged
and 7 upward) between 4 January 1999 and 2 May 2002.
y We do not use the indicators for statements on M3, as the number of observations di®erent
from zero per group is low (· 7).
27Table 8: OLS regressions of signal indicators on Taylor variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest rates In°ation Economic growth M3
HICP 2.23 -1.92 0.47 0.69*
(1.37) (3.31) (2.10) (0.39)
ESI 2.35** 1.70 3.08*** 0.68*
(0.96) (1.14) (0.79) (0.34)
M3 -0.33 -0.13 -1.44** 0.02
(0.46) (0.86) (0.72) (0.24)
it¡1 -2.84** 0.46 -4.29*** -1.24**
(1.34) (2.79) (1.23) (0.57)
¢it¡1 0.99 4.67 1.05 0.06
(1.22) (4.16) (1.21) (0.43)
Constant 7.56* 1.86 18.11*** 2.92
(4.26) (8.25) (5.66) (1.76)
Linear trend - - 0.14** -
(0.07)
Adj. R2 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.02
F-statistic 4.2*** 2.4** 2.3** 1.3
DW-statistic 1.9 2.3 2.4 2.1
Log L -188.3 -253.1 -198.9 -156.2
Note: This table gives full sample results for OLS regressions of ECB signal indicators on
the Taylor rule variables. The sample period is 4 January 1999 to 2 May 2002. Newey-West
standard errors in parentheses, */**/*** denotes signi¯cance at the 10/5/1 % level. .
28Table 9: Ordered probit regressions with predicted communication
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample EB NCB presidents Bundesbank
Signal on:
Interest rates 1.02*** 8.51* -0.40 2.86***
(0.32) (4.87) (0.47) (0.92)
In°ation -0.18* 0.28 -0.25* -0.86**
(0.09) (0.73) (0.13) (0.40)
Economic growth -0.04 -0.69 -2.70** 1.61**
(0.23) (0.85) (1.06) (0.70)
M3 -0.54 -1.96** 19.70*** -3.00
(0.55) (0.91) (6.92) (2.76)
¿1 -1.5 -1.1 -3.8 -2.1
¿2 2.6 2.9 1.2 2.8
Log pseudo-L -29.2 -29.4 -28.0 -25.8
Pseudo-R2 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.37
Note: This table gives results for ordered probit regression models of ECB interest rate deci-
sions if we use the predicted component of communication based on macroeconomic develop-
ments. The sample period is 4 January 1999 to 2 May 2002. Standard errors in parentheses,
*/**/*** denotes signi¯cance at the 10/5/1 % level. We use Hubert-White robust estimates
of variance in all cases.
29Table 10: Ordered probit regressions with ¯ltered communication
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample EB NCB presidents Bundesbank
Signal on:
Interest rates 0.09 0.47 -0.12 0.12
(0.08) (0.30) (0.09) (0.09)
In°ation -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.09
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08)
Economic growth -0.04 -0.03 0.08 -0.25**
(0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12)
M3 -0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.08
(0.06) (0.05) (0.17) (0.17)
¿1 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5
¿2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4
Log pseudo-L -40.3 -39.5 -40.3 -39.0
Pseudo-R2 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05
Note: This table gives results for ordered probit regression models of ECB interest rate de-
cisions if we use the ¯ltered component of communication. The sample period is 4 January
1999 to 2 May 2002. Standard errors in parentheses, */**/*** denotes signi¯cance at the
10/5/1 % level. We use Hubert-White robust estimates of variance in all cases.
30